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ANTITRUST AND THE LAY LAWYER
By BRUCE DUCKER*
It is often said that the merit of a good attorney is his ability
to spot the issues in a legal problem. Realizing that a substantial
number of attorneys know very little about antitrust and trade
regulation laws, Mr. Ducker discusses those problems which are
most frequently encountered in counseling small business. The
emphasis is on federal law, but Colorado regulations are discussed
when applicable. After placing the regulation of business in its
historical setting, Mr. Ducker discusses price controls: price fixing,
sales below cost, price maintenance, andrefusal to deal. Attention
is then directed to the major problems involved in exclusivity,
whether it be in market, sales, or purchases. The author first
discusses exclusive dealing arrangements in the vertical chain of
supply, followed by a consideration of the legal consequences of
requirements contracts and tying arrangements. Exclusivity in the
form of exclusive franchises is also examined. This is followed
by a discussion of trade associations, their value, and the steps
which must be taken to insure that they do not contravene appli-
cable laws. Mr. Ducker concludes his article by discussing the
civil remedies available to a client who has been wronged by the
illegal actions of another. In particular, the treble damage action
is analyzed, with special emphasis on the elements of proof.
INTRODUCTION
S THE title of this article suggests, many lawyers view the
body of antitrust and trade regulation laws as something both
remote and esoteric. It is true that few general practitioners in
Colorado are called upon to merge a soap company with a diversi-
fied food manufacturer, and even fewer are engaged to divest the
two. Nevertheless, most businessmen come in frequent contact with
antitrust problems. This article would attempt to make their law-
yers aware of that contact.
The reader should be cautioned that this article will be of
little interest or utility to those who practice regularly in the field.
It will provide answers to only the simplest problems, and even
those answers should be supported by independent research. For
the more complex situations, this article may be of some help as
a starting point for investigation. Of necessity, the attempt to cover
a substantial body of law in one article has resulted in some over-
simplification. The law of refusal to deal, tying agreements, and
exclusive dealings are not nearly as settled as may appear. In other
words, the sole strength of this type of survey - conciseness - also
has the inherent weaknesses of superficiality and oversimplification.
*Associate, Gorsuch, Kirgis, Campbell, Walker and Grover, Denver, Colorado; A.B.
Dartmouth College, 1960; M.A., Columbia University, 1963; LL.B., Columbia Univer-
sity, 1964.
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I. THE HISTORICAL SETTING
Before inquiring into the laws themselves, some attention
should be given to their historical and economic origins. What are
the antitrust laws, and how did they come into being? It is fair to
say that these controls were the result of dangerous abuses of the
free enterprise system.
The Industrial Revolution produced both giant industrialists
and a creed they held inviolable. Those who had risen to the top
of the competitive heap in the first half of the nineteenth century
owed their success to the resources of this country and to the climate
of freedom it had afforded them. Between 1800 and 1850, great
fortunes had been accumulated, fortunes which bestowed consider-
able power upon their holders. These men, inventive and aggressive,
found in the structure of the contemporaneous economy an oppor-
tunity for even greater power: pools or agreements were formed
within an industry to avoid the rigors of competition. For instance,
several railroads would agree to divide the market area and thus
eliminate rate wars.
The corporate extension of this scheme was the trust. By acqui-
sition and merger, virtually an entire industry could be forged to-
gether under one directorship. The first great trust, Standard Oil
Company of Ohio, emerged in 1882. Within five years similar
combinations had been wrought in sugar, whisky and cotton-oil.
The implications to the health of the national economy were dire
and evident: free enterprise had produced an octopus which could
strangle the parent by monopolistic control. To break the grip
of the trusts, Congress in 1890 passed the Sherman Antitrust Act,'
making illegal the monopolization of trade and combining or con-
spiring in restraint of trade. The law was not idle for long. Under
Theodore Roosevelt, the "trust buster," and William Howard Taft,
all major trusts were attacked; in their combined eleven years in the
White House, the government instituted some 114 cases.2 From this
litigation the most significant development was the emergence of
the "rule of reason,"' that is, that only unreasonable restraints of
trade were illegal.
The Supreme Court's formulation of this rule of reason consti-
tuted, in the eyes of many, a threat to the efficacy of the Sherman
Act itself. Would not the rule of reason permit continued abuses
of monopolistic power, under the shibboleth of reasonable restraint?
The nation's uncertainty about Sherman Act application was re-
flected in the election of 1912, in which remedial legislation became
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
2 E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 14 (1964).
3 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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a part of both parties' platforms. In 1914, Congress passed the
Clayton Act' and the Federal Trade Commission Act.5 The former
was directed against exclusive dealings and interlocking director-
ates; the latter outlawed unfair methods of competition. The Clayton
Act was significantly amended in 1939 by the Robinson-Patman
Act," attempting to restrict discriminatory favors and pricing.
While various other statutes have been enacted, the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act, as amended, and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act constitute the heart of federal antitrust law. As exercises
of the authority of Congress to regulate foreign and interstate com-
merce, these statutes do not apply to transactions affecting com-
merce within one state only.7 When referring to federal laws, the
following discussion assumes the requisite interstate contact.
If these contacts do not exist, a transaction must nevertheless
conform to certain standards, since a second, independent body of
state antitrust laws exists. In Colorado, for example, four desultory
articles of our statutes relate to fair trade contracts," unfair prac-
tices including sales below cost,9 cigarette sales,'" and restraints of
trade and commerce." Treatment is given below to fair trading
and selling below cost; cigarette sales have been omitted entirely.
Some mention should also be made of the remaining state provisions.
The Colorado Unfair Practices Act 12 prohibits price discrimi-
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27 (1964).
5 Id. §§ 41-58.
61d. §§ 13-13b, 21a.
7 In Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), the Supreme Court held that
interstate commerce is affected by anything happening in the flow of commerce,
even though the events are wholly within one state. As a result, there are few trans-
actions indeed which do not come within the federal antitrust laws.
8 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 55, art. 1 (1963).
9 Id. art. 2.
20 Id. art. 3.
11 Id. art. 4.
121d. § 55-2-1(1):
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, doing business in
the state of Colorado and engaged in the production, manufacture, distribu-
tion or sale of any commodity, or products, or service or output of a
service trade, of general use or consumption, or the sale of any merchandise
or product by any public utility, with the intent to destroy the competition
of any regular established dealer in such commodity, product or service,
or to prevent the competition of any person, firm, private corporation, or
municipal or other public corporation, who or which in good faith, in-
tends and attempts to become such dealer, to discriminate between different
sections, communities, or cities or portions thereof, or between different
locations in such sections, communities, cities or portions thereof in this
state, by selling or furnishing such commodity, product or service at a lower
rate in one section, community or city, or any portion thereof, or in one
location in such section, community, or city or any portion thereof than in
another after making allowance for difference, if any, in the grade or
quality, quantity and in the actual cost of transportation from the point of
production, if a raw product or commodity, or from the point of manufac-
ture, if a manufactured product or commodity. Motion picture films when
delivered under a lease to motion picture houses shall not be deemed to be
a commodity or product of general use, or consumption, under this article.
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nation of the same bent outlawed by Robinson-Patman. The state
law specifically prohibits secret rebates and refunds, 3 and sales
below costs,14 and provides criminal' 5 and treble damage civil 6
remedies for its violation.
Colorado's "little Sherman Act" outlaws, with a bit more speci-
ficity than its prototype, the same areas of activity: contracts, com-
binations, trusts, pools and agreements restraining or intending to
restrain trade,"7 as well as conspiracies to enter these alliances.' 8
Authority is given the courts to enjoin formation of these com-
binations' and the contracts themselves are voided.20 Although
a civil remedy is provided, damages are restricted to those actually
incurred. 2
The state, then, has afforded an ersatz remedy for the com-
petitor wronged by both discriminatory practices and restraints of
trade. But, as is the case with most state antitrust laws, these stat-
utes have gone largely unused. The discriminatory practices section
of the Unfair Trade Act, enacted in 1937, has been cited in but
eight reported decisions, both state and federal.2 The "little Sherman
Act" has received no mention whatsoever since its 1947 enactment.
The explanation for the atrophy of the latter is obvious: a
p!aintiff offering basically the same proof in federal court stands
to gain thrice what he would in state court. But the Colorado price
discrimination statute includes treble damages, and still it is not
used. The preference for the federal remedy is, of course, the
lawyers' rather than the clients'. It is suggested that the reasons
for this preference are practical. Federal judges are more familiar
with the statutory intricacies involved. The lawyer may borrow from
the welter of existing precedent on Robinson-Patman, as contrasted
with the scarcity of interpretation under state laws. Also, cases are
13 COLO. REV. STAT. Ai'. § 55-2-7 (1963).
14 1d. § 55-2-3.
15 Id. § 55-2-14.
'6 1d. § 55-2-9.
17 Id. § 55-4-1.
ls d. § 55-4-2.
19 Id. § 55-4-5.
20 Id. § 55-4-6.
21 Id. § 55-4-8.
2United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945); United States v.
Maryland State Licensed Beverage Ass'n, 138 F. Supp. 685 (D. Md. 1956) ; Flank
Oil Co. v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 141 Colo. 554, 349 P.2d 1005 (1960) ;
City and County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919
(1959); Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139
(1956) ; Perkins v. King Soopers, Inc., 122 Colo. 263, 221 P.2d 343 (1950) ; Old
Homestead Bread Co. v. Marx Baking Co., 108 Colo. 375, 117 P.2d 1007 (1941) ;
Dikeou v. Food Distrib. Ass'n, 107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529 (1940). In none of




generally heard more quickly in federal court, a prime consideration
for a plaintiff who is facing a protracted fight. Finally, a defendant
faced with a private action in federal court is aware that unlimited
warfare, with its accompanying discovery, may pique the interest of
federal forces, either the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade
Commission. By joining battle in federal court, a plaintiff exposes
his opponent to a possible rear-guard attack, which is conducive to
out-of-court settlement.28
Plaintiffs' lawyers nevertheless might consider the state laws
as tools for protection, since in certain circumstances they may either
afford the only remedy or better suit a particular need. Despite the
"flow of commerce" theory which has so expanded interstate com-
merce, industries still exist which are purely intrastate;2 4 the state
court, therefore, affords their only forum. Also, the state courts
and state legislature would be more familiar with problems endemic,
and perhaps peculiar, to the region. Finally, the alternative forum
may better suit one whose situation has been precedented by adverse
treatment under the federal laws.
So much for apology, history, and premise - what do the laws
say? The problems selected for discussion are those most frequently
encountered in counseling a small business, with one notable ex-
ception - price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman amend-
ments.25 Problems of pricing and exclusivity are considered, with
emphasis on Colorado peculiarities. The section on trade associa-
tions .reflects the increasing interest by small enterprises in this
device for competing more effectively. Finally, some comment is
given to the wronged client and his remedy of private action.
II. PRICE CONTROL
A. Price Fixing
Pricing, perhaps the most crucial of business decisions, fre-
quently raises intricate antitrust problems. Price fixing is not among
them, since the law's treatment of the practice is far from prob-
lematical - agreements between competitors which tend to fix prices
2 It may also help the plaintiff to satisfy his burden of proof. See text accompanying
note 113 infra.
2
4 These are more likely the businesses unaware of their rights under antitrust laws
and thus vulnerable to predatory practices of others.
25 Small business counseling in the Robinson-Patman area is the subject of an excellent
article by Earl W. Kintner, former chairman of the Federal Trade Commission,
appearing in 23 FED. B. J. 309 (1963).
Other less common problems involving the merger provisions of the Clayton
Act, unfair methods of competition, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and such
specialized legislation as the Automobile Dealers Act and the Bank Merger Act are
not within the scope of this article.
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are simply illegal.2" The motives of the parties, the volume of busi-
ness involved,27 the effect on the price (whether depressant or
stimulant), the reasonableness of the price,28 the possible ameliora-
tive effects upon competition29 - all these have been held to be of
no consequence. The prohibition applies equally to buyers and to
sellers,3" to the sale of services as well as products,8 ' and to all
participants in the chain of production and supply. This rule of
forbidden activity is the clearest of the "per se" violations. Once
price fixing is established, prosecutorial inquiry need proceed no
further, and no defense will be effective." The reason for this has
been spelled out by the Supreme Court: "The power to fix prices,
whether reasonably exercised or not involves power to control the
market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices.' '33
B. Sales Below Cost
Antitrust issues do not always hinge on the presence of concert
among competitors. If the client seeks unilaterally to employ
pricing techniques, his actions will be subject to antitrust legisla-
tion if anticompetitive in their effect. The Sherman Act does not
specifically prohibit sales either at unreasonably low prices or below
cost; rather, it proscribes general results - monopolization and
restraint of trade.3 4
Whether sales below cost produce these results is a question
of fact, turning, for the most part, upon two indices: first, the con-
trol of the market exercised by the seller; second, his intent in mak-
ing the sale.35  Although seemingly distinct, the two indices are
often meshed, for, unfortunately, courts are prone to view the exist-
ence of market dominance as indicative of predatory intent. To
illustrate, in one case,3 6 the defendant managed some of its stores
2 6 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
27 United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
28United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
29 Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co.,
184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950).
30 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
31 United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
32 See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1956).
33United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
34 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
35See, e.g., United States v. New York Great Atil. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th
Cir. 1949); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) ; Hershel California Fruit Products Co. v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 732
(N.D. Cal. 1953). These cases indicate that, under federal law, sales below cost may
have justifiable and salutary economic effects, and that it is the effect of these sales,
not their mere existence, which may make them illegal.
3 6 United States v. New York Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
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at a gross profit so low as to be under the cost of operations. The
scope of its operations was large enough to enable it to spread this
apparent loss among its other stores. It could thus exert intense
and localized pressure upon certain competitors, pressure so keen
as to be adjudicated illegal. Although no specific proof of intent
was proffered, the court held that the mere pattern of conduct
clearly established an anticompetitive purpose.
37
Another line of attack on sales below cost is Section 13 of the
Robinson-Patman Act, which makes it unlawful for any person to
sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices for the
purpose of destroying competition or of eliminating a competitor.38
This statute has not been widely utilized because suits for its vio-
lations can more easily be sustained under the "monopolization"
and "restraint of trade" language of the Sherman Act.
Aside from federal statutes, sales below cost are also subject
to state regulation. In Colorado, for example, certain below-cost
sales are outlawed by statute. Although the words of the act appear
to establish these sales as per se violations, 39 interpretation by the
state supreme court has emphasized that the intent to injure com-
petitors is an essential element of the prohibited action.4" The court
has correctly noted that to be a constitutional exercise of the state's
police power, only those sales which are intended to injure the
public may be prohibited.4t
New Jersey has attempted to outlaw the mere sale of goods
below cost, regardless of motive, and has seen its law thrown out
as unconstitutional in failing to define any public harm or damage
to be averted.42 Public interest, then, is threatened only when below-
cost sales are used to prey upon a competitor.
37 Id. at 88.
38 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
39 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-3 (1963):
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, firm, corporation,
joint stock company, or other association engaged in business within this
state, to sell, offer for sale or advertise for sale any article or product, or
service or output of a service trade for less than the cost thereof to such
vendor, or give, offer to give or advertise the intent to give away any article
or product, or service or output of a service trade for the purpose of in-
juring competitors and destroying competition and he or it shall also be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be subject to the
penalties set out in Section 55-2-14 for any such act.
4 0 Perkins v. King Soopers, Inc., 122 Colo. 263, 221 P.2d 343 (1950); Miller's
Groceteria Co. v. Food Distrib. Ass'n, 107 Colo. 113, 109 P.2d 637 (1941) ; Dikeou
v. Food Distrib. Ass'n, 107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529 (1940).
41 Perkins v. King Soopers, Inc., 122 Colo. 263, 267, 221 P.2d 343, 345 (1950) (em-
phasis added).
42 State v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 123 N.J.L. 180, 8 A.2d 291 (1939).
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One last aspect of sales below cost is notable for the Colorado
practitioner. The Colorado legislature has defined the illegal pur-
pose involved as that of "injuring competitors and destroying com-
petition."43  Nevertheless, in an imposing line of decisions, the
Colorado Supreme Court has treated these two requirements as alter-
natives.44 The court has said:
It is most apparent that proof of a sale of merchandise below cost
is not "in and of itself, by virtue of its own force, conclusive" in
support of the intent of the seller to thereby injure competitors or
destroy competition. Such a sale might be made with an intent
wholly unrelated to injuring competitors or destroying competition. 4 5
The construction would substitute a judicial "or" for the legis-
lative "and." The substitution would be logical. As it now reads,
the statute is inaccurate and redundant - the destruction of com-
petition necessarily includes the injury of competitors, or at the
least, the preclusion of potential competitors. On the other hand,
below-cost sales can be imagined which might temporarily injure
competitors, by drawing individual product consumption from them,
but which would not destroy competition in that product. Under
the words of the act, these sales would be permissible; under the
judicial construction, they would not. While the question thus re-
mains technically open, the legal counselor might best proceed on
the assumption that a purpose either to injure competitors or to
destroy competition will be sufficient at trial.
Not all sales below cost are illegal, for both state and federal
laws recognize the possible economic justification for setting a
markedly low price. Every retailer would readily agree with this
conclusion. A merchant may wish to introduce a new product or
open a new store in a particular area and use a low price to offset
the entrenchment of the competition. He may find that his com-
petition has legally been able to beat him to the price-cut punch.46
He may be seeking, by increasing his volume without a commen-
surate increase in profits, to avail himself of a cost-justified discount.
Or perhaps he wishes to employ a loss leader - one product priced
43 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-3(1) (1963) (emphasis added).
"Perkins v. King Soopers, Inc., 122 Colo. 263, 221 P.2d 343 (1950); Miller's Gro-
ceteria Co. v. Food Distrib. Ass'n 107 Colo. 113, 109 P.2d 637 (1941) ; Dikeou v.
Food Distrib. Ass'n, 107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529 (1940).
4Perkins v. King Soopers, Inc., 122 Colo. 263, 268, 221 P.2d 343, 345 (1950) (em-
phasis added).
46 The Colorado statute recognizes the good-faith meeting of competition as one of
the four exclusions from the act. The others are close-out or seasonal sales, the sale
of damaged or deteriorated goods, and sale pursuant to a court order. COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 55-2-6 (1963).
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low in an effort to attract purchasers for other products. 7 These
practices should be, and apparently are, permitted so long as they
invigorate the general market place.
C. Price Maintenance
Even the most unsophisticated manufacturer will, early in his
business career, realize that his profit margin would be protected
if he could set the resale price of his product. When he consults
his lawyer, he wants to know, not whether, but how he can do this,
and what "muscle" he can use to enforce obedience.
A manufacturer, whether in interstate or intrastate commerce,
may establish the price at which his product is to be resold if he
can place himself within his state's fair trade laws. This situation
was made possible by the Miller-Tydings Act" and the McGuire
Act, 9 federal laws which exempt from existing antitrust application
contracts prescribing resale prices so long as those contracts are
lawful under state law as applied to intrastate transactions. Thus,
fair trade laws place a significant portion of commerce beyond the
reach of the price-fixing interdiction of both local and federal
antitrust laws. Generally, they establish the legality of a contract
relating to the resale of a product whose producer can be identified
by his mark, where that product is in open and free competition
with similar products." ° The degree of variance among the states
in the substantive treatment of this exemption is remarkably slight,
variations being, for example, whether the seller can establish a
47 The practice of "loss leaders" is common to retailers in every state. This area has
been subject to more litigation in California than in any other state. Section 17044
of California's Business and Professions Code flatly prohibits their use, with no
provision as to competitive injury. In another section, the Code declares that it is
unlawful for any person to sell any product at less than cost for the purpose of
injuring competitors or destroying competition. The California courts have found in
this latter section a pervading legislative intent, and have therefore incorporated this
purpose as a requirement of the "loss leader" prohibition. Wholesale Tobacco
Dealers Bureau of Southern California v. National Candy and Tobacco Co., 11 Cal.
2d 634, 82 P.2d 3 (1938) ; Northern California Food Dealers, Inc. v. Farmers Mkt.
of Northern California, Inc., 1956 Trade Cas. t 68,402, (Cal. Super. Ct.); Ellis
v. Dallas, 11 Cal. App. 2d 234, 248 P.2d 63 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
4850 Stat. 693 (1937), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1.
4 9 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964).
5o The Colorado Fair Trade Act is not atypical:
(a) No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bears
or the label or container of which bears, the trademark, brand or name of
the producer or distributor of such commodity, and which commodity is in
free and open competition with commodities of the same general class
produced or distributed by others shall be deemed in violation of any law
of the State of Colorado by reason of any of the following provisions which
may be contained in such contract:
(b) That the buyer will not resell such commodity at less than the minimum
price stipulated by the seller;
(c) That the buyer will require of any dealer to whom he may resell such
commodity an agreement that he will not, in turn, resell at less than the
minimum price stipulated by the seller.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 55-1-1(1) (1963).
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minimum or absolute price, or whether the owner of the identifying
mark, rather than the producer, may set the price.
The important variation among the laws of these several juris-
dictions concerns the "non-signer" clause - that provision of the
Fair Trade Act which binds all persons so notified to the price set
in the contract between manufacturer and retailer." Of the forty-
three states with fair trade legislation, all but two include non-signer
provisions. 52 Only seventeen, however, have withstood the challenge
of constitutionality.
3
The Colorado non-signer clause was among the casualties. Hav-
ing survived two lower court challenges,5 4 it came under the scrutiny
of the state supreme court in Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation
v. Francis.55
In that case, a manufacturer of guns and ammunition sought
to enforce compliance to the non-signer clause by enjoining one not
a party to the contract from undercutting the established price. The
court reasoned that the state's police power was the only possible
source of authority for the regulation of prices on the open market.
Since there was no public interest inherent in the sale of firearms,
the legislature may not affix prices to those sales, nor grant another,
i.e., the manufacturer, the right to do so. Following this reasoning,
the court struck down the non-signer clause as unconstitutional. 56
It might be mentioned in passing that this opinion fails to come
to grips with antitrust and economic principles as we now conceive
them. Our economy is not one of free competition, but rather one
delicately controlled as to both buyer and seller. The decision of
whether to permit, within this economy, transactions binding not
only the parties thereto but their competitors as well must be made
on the pragmatic needs and weaknesses of the economy itself.
5 7
51 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 55-1-4 (1963):
Underselling unfair competition-Willfully and knowingly advertising,
offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated
in any contract entered into pursuant to the provisions of this article,
whether the person so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not
a party to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit
of any person damaged thereby.
5 Maine and North Dakota, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
53 Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mis-
sissippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin, 2 Trade Reg. Rep.
6021.
54 Parker Pen Co. v. Zale, 1956 Trade Cas. 68,416 (Weld Dist. Ct.).
55 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956).
5Id. at 186.
57 See Cooley, Survey of Pennsylvania Law: Constitutional Law, 26 U. Prrr. L. REV.
at 171-79 (1964), for an analysis of the constitutionality of non-signer pro-
visions; Kellog, Czar in Lambskin? 1965 WIs. L. REv. 133, for comment on the
problems besetting state regulation of economics; Comment, Resale Price Mainten-
ance, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1277 (1965), for discussion of a recent British act attempt-
ing to eliminate minimum prices for resale.
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Fair trading must be distinguished from price fixing. The Fair
Trade Act does not authorize a conspiracy to fix prices to the detri-
ment of competition. Rather, the Act concerns only those products
in free and open competition with those of the same general class
produced and distributed by others. With this in mind, the federal
district court has held the Act to be no defense to a charge of con-
certed attempt to eliminate competition in certain trademarked
brands.58
In summary, maintenance of resale prices is possible only if
one can comply with his state's fair trade laws. Even then, in Colo-
rado the manufacturer has no remedy against a price cutter with
whom he has no privity of contract. The manufacturer may decide
to refuse to deal with, or supply, the disobedient. If this occurs,
various legal issues must be confronted.
D. Refusal to Deal
Any discussion of the individual's right to refuse to sell must
begin with United States v. Colgate & Co.,59 in which the Supreme
Court first established that the Sherman Act does not of itself
impinge upon one's freedom to deal with whom he wishes, absent
monopolistic purposes. But to naively accept this as guidance is
hazardous, for Colgate has been clarified and distinguished by nearly
fifty years of court treatment in this area.
In reality, one with monopoly power who selectively refuses
to deal does so at his peril. The greater his market dominance, the
stronger will be the court's presumption of a covert, illegal purpose.60
Behind the antitrust laws exists, of course, a legislative desire to
maintain free access to any sector of commerce for those who seek it.
The greater difficulty one has in obtaining supplies, the greater are
the obligations of possible suppliers to him. The law will not be
satisfied with merely a theoretical opportunity to "shift for oneself";
unless access is open in fact, a dangerous probability exists that an
industry is coagulating into oligopoly, with the potential for evolv-
ing into a de facto monopoly." '
Colgate nominally allows a unilateral, well-intentioned refusal
to deal. Here again, action permissive when done by one is pro-
58 United States v. Colorado Wholesale Wine and Liquor Dealers Ass'n, 47 F. Supp.
160 (D. Colo. 1942).
59 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
60 Banana Distrib., Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
61 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); National Screen Serv.
Corp. v. Poster Exch. Inc., 305 F.2d 647 '(5th Cir. 1962) ; Campbell Distrib. Co. v.
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 208 F. Supp. 523 (D. Md. 1962). In United States v.
Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945), the court apologeti-
cally notes that, although the manufacturer had legitimately achieved its position as
the only producer of linen rugs, its use of that position in refusing to sell was illegal.
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hibited when done in coalition with others. 62  Collusive or con-
certed boycotts are per se violations of the Sherman Act.
Only last year, the Supreme Court examined and found a
"classic conspiracy in restraint of trade. ' 63 In that case, testimony
revealed that Chevrolet dealers were supplying cars for resale to
Los Angeles discount houses, contrary to the wishes of General
Motors. The defendant and three dealer associations, in an attempt
to eliminate the practice, prohibited a dealer by contract from mov-
ing to or establishing "a new or different location, branch sales
office, branch service station, or place of business including any
used car lot or location without the prior written approval of Chev-
rolet.'" "\Xjhile the argument on appeal centered around the validity
of this clause, the Supreme Court saw beyond the explicit agree-
ment to a
joint, collaborative action by dealers, the appellee associations, and
General Motors to eliminate a class of competitors by terminating
business dealings between them and a minority of Chevrolet dealers
and to deprive franchised dealers of their freedom to deal through
discounters if they so choose. . . . Elimination, by joint collabora-
tive action, of discounters from access to the market is a per se
violation of the Act.
65
What, then, is left of the permissiveness once allowed by
Colgate? Is it an invisible shield, or is it merely invisible? The
current status of Colgate may be illustrated by examination of two
recent cases involving the oil industry. In one, the Union Oil Com-
pany was enjoined from threatening non-renewal of the dealer's
lease, where the threat had effectively coerced maintenance of estab-
lished resale prices.66 In a similar case, the court of appeals redefined
the Colgate rule, saying that it
means no more today than that a simple refusal to sell to customers
who will not resell at prices suggested by the seller is permissible
under the Sherman Act. It allows each customer to decide inde-
pendently to observe specified resale prices if induced to do so
solely by a seller's announced policy. United States v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 362 U.S. 29, 43-44.... On this summary judgment record,
to hold that the defendant's actions do not establish a Sherman Act
violation would serve to breathe new life into a doctrine we think
fatally drugged by Parke, Davis & Co.6 7
Thus, while the core of Colgate still remains intact, all excess
has been pared away. The ability to refuse to deal may be exer-
cised freely, so long as it is not exercised in concert or with monopo-
listic motives. Courts are apparently more sensitive to motives im-
62 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
6 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 140 (1966).
6Id. at 130.
6 Id. at 140-45.
66 Weingartner v. Union Oil Co. of Calif. 1966 Trade Cas. J 71,757 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
67Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346, 350 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1965).
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plemented through boycotts, and the combination of competitive
zeal with a refusal to deal may be unlawful even though neither
element would be so on its own.
III. EXCLUSIVITY IN MARKET, SALES OR PURCHASES
A. Exclusive Dealings
Wholesalers have historically been solicited by the manufac-
turers who supply them to handle certain products to the exclusion
of competing products. They, in turn, may seek to require their
retail outlets to do the same. On any level of the distributive chain
-manufacturer, jobber, dealer -these transactions are subject to
the application of Section 3 of the Clayton Act.68 Under this stat-
ute, one cannot sell or lease goods on the condition that the recipient
will not use or deal in the commodities of a competitor, if the effect
of that sale or lease or the condition itself may substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly. Further, one cannot fix
a price for any commodity, or discount from or rebate upon that
price, on the condition that the recipient refrain from dealing in the
competitor's goods, if his action would tend to have the requisite
effect.
Again, the oil companies have litigated the touchstone cases,
providing the guidelines for the small businessman. In one case,6 9
an integrated producer selling its own brand of gasoline, oils, and
lubricants, and a full line of TBA (tires, batteries and accessories)
purchased on consignment for resale, adopted the tactic of "full
line forcing." The company required its dealers to handle its gaso-
line exclusively, and to discontinue the advertising of competitive
oils and TBA, if they were to keep their dealerships. The dealers
were bound by written, as well as tacit, agreements pertaining to
the exclusive dealings with the supplying company. The Justice
Department challenged this practice and the court had little diffi-
culty in finding the requisite anti-competitive effect in this most
vigorous of industries.
A more sophisticated situation was presented to the Supreme
6815 U.S.C. § 14 (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether
patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia, or any insular
possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix
a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on
the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser
thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor
or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such
condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen compe-
tition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
69 United States v. Sun Oil Co., 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
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Court in Atlantic Refining Company v. FTC.70 Again, the pernici-
ous effect alleged was the defendant's method of TBA marketing.
Atlantic Refining Company had agreed, in return for a commission,
to assist Goodyear in promoting the sale of tires, batteries and
accessories to the oil company's retail outlets. Noting the compara-
tive strength of Atlantic, coupled with Atlantic's threats that dealer-
ships depended upon the purchase of sufficient quantities of TBA
and compliance with the Goodyear sales program, the Court found
Atlantic in violation of the Clayton Act.
Two aspects of this case are particularly notable. The first is
that, by dispensing with the usual economic analysis of percentages
and market dominance, the Court did not establish a quantum of
necessary strength. This omission is explicable by the fact that in
the six-year period in question, sales of tires, batteries, and acces-
sories totaled over fifty million dollars. The second noteworthy
aspect of the case was Justice Stewart's dissent, in which he ques-
tioned the substantive conclusions of the majority opinion.7 While
coercive practices might violate the antitrust laws, he noted, the
device of sales commissions in itself does not. This device had
merely modified a previous Atlantic plan, under which Atlantic
purchased the tires, batteries, and accessories, warehoused them,
and sold them to its dealers. Under the refined plan Atlantic freed
itself from the necessity for storage and distribution facilities. The
old method had not enabled Atlantic any peculiar leverage over its
dealers, said Justice Stewart, and neither did the new.
For the small businessman, the protection afforded, if any,
is far from clear. His arm apparently may be bent, but not too far.
The Atlantic Refining case indicates that the law is tending to offer
him further insulation from economic bullying.
B. Requirements Contracts and Tying Arrangements
Closely related to exclusive dealings are the marketing devices
of requirements contracts and tying arrangements. Although these
devices are prevalent in most industries, their legal consequences
are generally misunderstood. A requirements contract is an agree-
ment by which a purchaser is required to buy all, or a specific
portion, of its requirements of a product from the seller. It is
a first cousin to an exclusive dealing arrangement and the courts
have been but slightly more receptive to this member of the family.72
As with exclusive dealings, requirements contracts are subject
to Section 3 of the Clayton Act with its "substantial lessening of
70381 U.S. 357 (1965).
71 381 U.S. at 377.
72 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) ; Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston
Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
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competition" test.73 On its face, this test leaves room for economic
justification. In Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,74 a public
utility executed a twenty-year coal requirements contract, under
which it would purchase most of its coal needs from the seller.
After a thorough examination of the relevant market area, the
Court found no substantial lessening of competition.75
Tampa Electric has become the prototypal Section 3 case, con-
taining elements of both benefit and harm to the relevant market.
Obviously, requirements contracts foreclose market access to some
degree. Whether the market is being unduly restricted requires
an inquiry into the strength of the parties, the line of commerce,
and the effect of pre-emption of this one sector upon the general
economy. Also to be weighed in the balance are those salutary
effects - the efficiency in inventory and records, and the security
for a small or new business - which may prove to be the redeeming
virtues of the plan.
Tying arrangements, like requirements contracts, are subject
to Section 3 of the Clayton Act. A tying arrangement requires the
purchaser of one product to buy another product of the seller.7"
Section 3 prohibits tying arrangements when they have the pro-
scribed effect on competition. The peril to our economy posed by
these arrangements is clear. With sufficient leverage in the tying
product, a company may strong-arm its way into monopolistic control
of the tied product. If a person licenses his patented product on
the condition that the licensee use other patented or unpatented
products of the patentee, the patentee is, in effect, extending into
other areas a monopoly by grace. A strong market position in the
tying product would allow him to monopolize the tied product.
77
These tying arrangements are illegal if they have the effect
of substantially lessening competition. As should by now be appar-
ent, this assessment often emanates not from the economic facts or
the conduct of the individual, but from the hypothecation of their
effect upon competition. When has competition substantially been
lessened? And how can one assume that any abating was caused
by the activities of one competitor?
Two rules of thumb help to answer these conundrums with
respect to tie-ins. If either index is met, substantial competition has
- 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
74365 U.S. 320 (1961).
75
1d. at 333-35.
76 D.E. Stearns Co. v. Tinker & Rasor, 252 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Technical Tape
Corp. v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 247 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 952 (1958); United States v. J.I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D.
Minn. 1951).
7 7 Binks Mfg. Co. v. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1960);
Hunter Douglas Corp. v. Lando Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1954).
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been affected. In the first instance, the courts look to the economic
power over the tying product. In an illustrative case,78 the defend-
ants' volume of business was only $325,000 in an industry with a
total volume of $66,000,000, about one-half of one percent of the
total sales. Nevertheless, the defendants' practices were held to be
monopolistic because their control of a single product allowed them
to force other products on buyers. 9
The other indicator of substantially lessened competition is
the existence of a substantial quantum or control of commerce in
the tied product. For example, as the patentee of salt dispensing
machines, the International Salt Company leased its machines only
upon the condition that lessees purchase all salt to be used in the
machines from the lessor, unless they could purchase the salt at a
lower price. The tied product, salt, accounted for some $500,000
in sales in the year complained of. Holding these contracts illegal,
the Court said:
The volume of business affected by these contracts cannot be said
to be insignificant or insubstantial and the tendency of the arrange-
ment to accomplishment of monopoly seems obvious.80
Of the three methods of product-line forcing, the courts have
dealt most strictly with tying contracts. Counsel should react accord-
ingly, and, assuming that they serve few legitimate purposes short
of the suppression of competition, look upon tie-ins with a most
critical eye.
C. Exclusive Territories, Rights, and Franchises
With f-.e increase in popularity of the francise, providing a man
with a business of his own, comes an increasing demand upon the
general practictioner to counsel the franchisee as to what he
may ask from his corporate franchisor. The usual franchising
arrangement includes some guaranty that the new business will
receive a territory and perhaps products of its own for a certain
time. These guarantees may raise antitrust problems. This discus-
sion concerns only negotiations between those in vertical market
relationships: manufacturer to distributor, distributor to jobber,
78 Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault and Wiborg Corp., 83 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936).
7
9 Id. at 766.
80 International Salt, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). This case is also
notable for the benchmark it set in quashing incipient monopolistic tendencies. The
Supreme Court refused to void a summary judgment precluding the trial of issues
as to whether the contracts substantially lessened competition, saying:
Not only is price fixing unreasonable, per se, . . . but also it is unreasonable,
per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market .... Under the
law, agreements are forbidden which "tend to create a monopoly," and it is
immaterial that the tendency is a creeping one rather than one that pro-
ceeds at full gallop; nor does the law await arrival at the goal before
condemning the direction of the movement.
Thus, the Court employed the "either-or" test of Clayton, while using Sherman Act
language to nip the activity in the bud.
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jobber to retailer. Market, territorial, or customer division among
those of similar, or horizontal, function is not discussed, since it is a
per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.8
The exclusive franchise system, under which one starts in busi-
ness with the assurance of the franchisor that he will not franchise
competition within a delineated area, remains a permissible and
highly satisfactory method of commercial expansion . 2 The method,
however, has its legal limitations and should be drafted with an
eye to reasonableness in geographic scope and in duration.
Abuse of the franchise system can bring down upon the head
of the franchisor a charge of restricting the free flow of goods in
commerce and potentially blocking entry of competition. Illustra-
tive of this situation is Hathaway Motors, Inc. v. General Motors
Corp.,8 in which the complaint stated a cause of action by alleging
that automobile manufacturers maintained a system of exclusive
dealer franchises which excluded from the sale of new cars the
independents who would not yield to the system. The court felt
that the alleged scheme, which included pressure on banks, finance
companies, newspapers, and legislative bodies, as well as on those
within the industry, would, if proved, constitute a real detriment
to the consumer.8 4
Customer and territorial restrictions were both challenged in
White Motor Co. v. United States,"0 where the Supreme Court held
improper the conviction by summary judgment of a truck manufac-
turer's distribution system. Not atypically, the manufacturer had
divided areas and accounts among its distributors, reserving for
itself choice industrial, governmental and fleet customers. The
Supreme Court rejected the situation as the test case for vertical
territorial restrictions, because not enough appeared in the record
as to the actual impact of the distribution system on competition.8"
The Court remanded the case for further proof, and a consent judg-
ment8 7 frustrated the potential enlightenment of the business com-
munity. Nevertheless, by way of dictum, the Court indicated that
vertical territorial limitations and customer restrictions may be justi-
fiable and that they could not be barred on the theory that resale
price-fixing restrictions were an integral part of the whole distri-
81 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
82 See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.D.C.
1957).
3 18 F.R.D. 283 (D. Conn. 1955).
84 1d. at 284,285.
85 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
88 Id. at 263.
87 Reported at 1964 Trade Cas. 71,195, at 79,762 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 8, 1964).
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bution system if the price restrictions involved an insubstantial
amount of business. 88
In the summer of this year, the United States Supreme Court
added an interesting, if far from definitive, gloss to the law of
territorial restriction. The Department of Justice challenged the
marketing program of a leading bicycle producer. Distributors had
been assigned territories and were instructed to sell only to fran-
chised Schwinn accounts. Franchised retailers were not allowed to
resell to non-franchise dealers. The actual distribution took three
forms: assignment and agency sales to dealers through distributors,
direct sales to distributors, and direct sales to dealers with the dis-
tributors handling orders on commission. The deleterious effect
was asserted to be, not upon the bicycle market as a whole, but
simply upon the intrabrand competition which constituted one-
seventh of the total industry volume.89  The Court held illegal,
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the two requirements under
which bicycles purchased by distributors had to go to franchised
dealers, and those prohibiting franchised dealers from selling to
non-franchised dealers. Upheld as reasonable restraints of trade were
the territorial and customer restrictions applied to bicycles handled
by distributors through agency or consignment arrangements.90
Influencing the Court strongly in its decision were the avail-
ability of competitive bicycles, the healthy, vigorous competitive
arena justifying the marketing program, the ability of Schwinn dis-
tributors and retailers to handle other brands, and the failure of
the government to prove the alleged intermixture of this distribu-
tion program with price fixing. The Court approved this restrictive
distribution as an exercise of sound business reason, but warned
that
[t]he promotion of self-interest alone does not invoke the rule of
reason to immunize otherwise illegal conduct. It is only if the con-
duct is not unlawful in its impact in the marketplace or if the
self-interest coincides with the statutory concern with the preserva-
tion and promotion of competition that protection is achieved. 91
If this case establishes any definition of legality, then it is the
fleeting one of sound business practice. For the lawyer and his
client, however, flirting with an evanescent boundary is a precarious
practice indeed. The following remarks of Donald S. Turner, the
88 372 U.S. at 263.
89 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
90 Id. at 381.
91 Id. at 375. See also United States v. Scaly, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), holding
illegal a horizontal conspiracy to allocate territories among trademarks.
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head of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, suggest
no rule itself but a sound approach to rule-making:
[I] am not convinced that territorial restrictions are reasonably
necessary to any legitimate purpose save for one case, that involving
the entry of new firms and/or the introduction of new products.
These are commonly associated with relatively high degrees of risk
and uncertainty, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that territorial
restrictions may be necessary in many of such cases to induce dealers
to make the investment necessary to get the manufacturer's new
product effectively introduced. . . . It should be noted, however,
that, even in this case, the justification for territorial restrictions is
one limited in time.
. . . Territorial restrictions might be justifiable where they
appear to be the only method by which a weak firm can obtain
dealers. Nevertheless, while it is undoubtedly good antitrust policy,
generally speaking, to foster new entry, I am not at all sure that it
is good antitrust policy to attempt to preserve in this way companies
that have run the competitive race and have been fairly beaten.
To conclude, my tentative view is that territorial restrictions
on dealers are more restricted than is necessary to obtain legitimate
objectives in all but very limited circumstances. There are ample
alternative devices, all less restrictive than territorial restraints,
whereby a manufacturer can attempt to achieve an efficient, aggres-
sive marketing system.92
The legality of an exclusive market, then, depends primarily
on the reason for exclusivity in establishing, entering, or enlarging
a given market. Must a new franchisee get an area to himself to
survive? If he does, how large and for how long? Will the security
promised put him on an equal competitive footing, or a more lofty
position, beyond the reach of the existing competitors? Exclusivity,
whether in dealing, market allocation, or requirements purchasing,
is a tool easily abused. The conservative practitioner will insure its
proper use by employing it purposefully.
IV. TRADE ASSOCIATIONS
Competing business firms often meet with one another in an
attempt to improve their industry, and in the process, to assist the
individual firms themselves. To establish regular and proper pro-
cedures, they may decide to form a trade association. The antitrust
problems attendant to trade associations are more likely to arise
with the small businessman than with the large corporation, for the
small independent enterprise would more likely find in association
a mode of competing with the diversified giant.
Two patent facts of trade association life are notable. The
antitrust laws hold many acts, legal if done individually, illegal if
92Tumer, Some Reflections on Antitrust, 1966 NEw YORK STATE BAR Ass'N ANTI-
TRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 4-6.
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done in concert. Similarly, any activity illegal if done outside a
trade association is more easily proved illegal if done within it, for
by definition, a trade association involves competitors in concert.
Therefore, where conspiracy or combination is an element of the
offense, the existence of a trade association may tend to prove that
conspiracy.
Without defense, trade associations are in contravention of the
Sherman Act if they allocate territories or customers, restrict pro-
duction, limit channels of distribution, or fix and maintain prices
(assuming of course, the requisite effect on interstate commerce) .9
As recently as 1962, the Department of Justice proved a scheme
among pharmacists to maintain a schedule of prices for prescription
drugs. 4 This and other abuses of trade associations serve to con-
firm the suspicion that the Justice Department shares with Adam
Smith:
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merri-
ment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy
against the public or in some contrivance to raise prices.95
Is this suspicion justified? Are there no legitimate purposes
which a trade association can foster? The fact that they are growing
faster than consent decrees quash them indicates the contrary. 6
Associations can, and indeed do, develop new merchandising, re-
search, technical services and markets. They may conduct distribu-
tion studies, industry advertising campaigns, and trade shows. Tax
research, apprentice education, employee relations, arbitration, and
government-industry liason are all valid and fruitful areas of asso-
ciation concern, areas served particularly well by representatives of
an entire industry.97
Between these two lines of permissiveness and per se illegality
lie the troublesome situations in which one must look to the unique
combination of factors involved. The collection and distribution of
freight rate information was, when first challenged, found to be a
93The crucial cases in the area, to which relatively little has since been added, are the
following: Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936) ; Maple Flooring
Mfrs.' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); United States v. American
Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
9 4 United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29, 33 (D. Utah 1962):
The mere circumstance that goods in commerce are treated or handled by,
or otherwise connected with, a learned profession does not remove the
goods themselves, nor transactions affecting them, from the applicability
of the Sherman Act.
9 A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 128 (1st Modern Library ed. 1937).
98 Indeed, they are growing at a rate faster than that of the natural population.
JUDKiNS, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OF BUSINESSMEN (1961).
9 For a list of some eighty activities, see Judkins, Services of American Trade Asso-
ciations in 1953 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, mimeo. Aug. 1954).
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lawful activity.98 In a later case, however, the defendant afforded
its members the use of a common freight rate book. The Supreme
Court felt that such horizontal accessibility to a critical element in
price compilation was an element of competitive restraint and evi-
dence of illegal concert on pricing methods.99
In contrast to common rate schemes, efforts by associations to
standardize products are, in themselves, innocent and valuable.
Caution must be exercised to insure that this attempt to standardize
is voluntary, and limited to the product itself; 100 any carry-over
towards standardization of merchandising or pricing will taint the
entire program.' In addition, there should be some tangible benefit
of standardization, both to the public and to the industry itself.
Another device often attempted by associations is the pooling
of statistical information for association members. These collections
save members' time and can actually increase competition within a
given industry. The exchange of statistical information, however,
affords a perilous opportunity for competitors to evolve a price-
fixing or production-limiting scheme.'1 2 For this reason, any statis-
tical activities should meet the following criteria: (1) concern for
the present, rather than the future; (2) reference to no individual
company; (3) maintenance on a voluntary basis; and (4) distribu-
tion of statistics to any interested or appropriate parties including
the government.
Cost and price reporting programs touch the most sensitive
antitrust area and therefore should be conscientiously overseen. The
pooling of price and cost information is permissible when giving
rise to no conspiratorial inference, 0 3 but if concerted action is
"contemplated and invited," and the competitors accept that invi-
98 Maple Flooring Mfrs.' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) ; Cement Mfrs.'
Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
99 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683'(1948).
100 Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cr. 1948).
101 An analysis of the way good intentions are often extended beyond the pale of the
law is found in Bond, Crown, & Cork Co. v. FTC, 176 F.2d 974, 979 (4th Cir.
1959):
The standardization of product, for example, would be innocent enough by
itself, but not when taken in connection with standardization of discounts
and differentials, publication of prices with agreements not to charge less
than a minimum under patent license agreements affecting practically the
entire industry, the freight equalization which we have described and such
uniformity of prices throughout the industry as to leave no price competition
of any sort anywhere. The practice of freight equalization might be all
right if used by the manufacturers individually, but not when used in
connection with standardization of product, patent control, price publica-
tion and uniformity of discounts and trade practices in such way as to
destroy price competition.
10 2 See United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v.
American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
103 Cement Mfrs.' Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
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tation, even though their acceptance may be mute and tacit, the
Sherman Act is violated.10 4
Credit activities and services by trade associations suffer
similarly low toleration. The mere reporting of delinquent accounts
is a proper activity if devoted to a purpose not anti-competitive.
Unfortunately, in all recent litigation the trade association has
extrapolated from its credit reporting a blacklist system, which is
illegal as a combination to boycott.' 0 5
Apart from the legality of devices employed by trade associa-
tions, the constitution of the association itself may encounter legal
difficulties. While the exclusion of competitors from membership
is illegal, that of persons not within the trade group is permissible.'
Simply stated, membership may be restricted so long as the standards
for restriction are not inhibitive of competition. If an association con-
templates operating within the aegis of the antitrust laws, it should
have no compunction about opening its membership rolls. Inclusion
of the vertical components of an industry in a trade group, however,
is dangerous since it might create a fraternal approach towards ele-
ments of the economy which, under the philosophy of the Sherman
Act, are more properly thrashed out in competition. 7
The association should certainly formalize a statement of pur-
pose, specifying those worthwhile and legitimate ends it seeks to
achieve. At least one association was so overzealous and particular
in this attempt that it found its "Code of Fair Competition" struck
down by a court which disagreed with its characterization of the
I"' Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939). This case is
generally recognized as the genesis for the doctrine known as "conscious parallelism,"
under which a conspiracy and violation of the antitrust laws can be inferred simply
from the conduct of businessmen, each of whom knows his competitors are behaving
similarly. The doctrine enjoyed a dangerous growth in judicial popularity, at the
peak of which a conspiracy could be proved by nothing more than uniform par-
ticipation by competitors in a business practice injurious to trade, when the par-
ticipators knew of the others' activity. Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952); Bigalow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
Inc., 150 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
Its limits were, however, eventually recognized by the Supreme Court, which avowed
that it "has never held that proof of parallel business behavior conclusively estab-
lishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself constitutes a
Sherman Act offense." Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distribution
Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954). The validity of conscious parallelism is aptly
demonstrated by this analogy from the classroom of Professor Milton Handler: if
his 100 students appear at law school with raincoats and umbrellas, whether a
conspiracy could be inferred will depend largely upon whether it looks like rain.
105See, e.g., Tag Mfrs.' Institute v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949).
106 Cf. United States v. Insurance Bd., 188 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1960); United
States v. Southern Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n, 207 F. 434 (N.D. Ala. 1913). See
also United States v. New Orleans Exch., 148 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. La. 1957), aff'd,
355 U.S. 22 (1957) ; American Fed'n of Tobacco Growers, Inc. v. Neal, 183 F.2d
869 (4th Cir. 1950); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
107Radiant Burners, Inc. v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961);
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945); Advertising
Specialty Nat'l Ass'n v. FTC, 238 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1956).
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code.' °8 The punctiliousness with which minutes of meetings are
kept, the presence of able counsel, and the constant supervision by
trade association officers or employees will all contribute to main-
taining a course between inefficacy on the one hand and illegality
on the other.
V. PRIVATE SUITS - THE TREBLE DAMAGE ACTION
Those who violate the antitrust laws may, like Lear, suffer
doubly. There is first the threat of criminal prosecution, fine, and
imprisonment. There is also the possibility of a treble damage action
brought by those whom the violation has injured. In the remaining
pages, attention will be focused on the popularity of this civil remedy
and the possibility of injunctive relief. Also discussed are the elements
of proof: an antitrust violation; injury to the plaintiff; and com-
putation of damages. Finally, some attention is given to attorney s
fees and other costs of the litigation.
The private civil action is peculiarly suited to enforcing the
antitrust laws and to compensating the victim. Industry members
are more likely to know when unfair competitive practices are being
used against them, and the incentive of recovering three times their
damages will encourage them to act on that knowledge. The increase
in popularity of this remedy is evidenced by the following table:1 °9
NUMBER OF ANTITRUST CASES COMMENCED IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS BY FISCAL YEARS
1941-1945 1946-1950 1951-1955 1956-1960 1961-1965
Government Suits 284 256 197 317 346
Private Suits 297 529 1054 1163 3598
The primary basis of the civil action is Section 4 of the Clayton
Act." In addition, Section 16 provides private litigants with in-
junctive relief from a violation which threatens direct and serious
loss or damage to the plaintiff."' Injunctions, however, have not
often been sought, for most defendants who have been sued success-
fully for treble damages will voluntarily eschew conduct that would
similarly jeopardize them in the future.
0a United States v. Abrasive Grain Ass'n, 1948 Trade Cas. 62,329, at 62,839 (S.D.
N.Y. Nov. 16, 1948).
109 Note, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1475 (1966).
110 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964):
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or
is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
11115 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
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Because injunctive relief is seldom demanded, the principal
weapon of the private litigant is the treble damage action. The
elements of this action are simply a violation of the antitrust laws,
causing injury to the plaintiff's business or property.1 12 As is appar-
ent from the earlier discussion, comprehending when a violation
has occurred is in itself no mean feat. Proving the violation without
the investigative and prosecutorial staff available to the govern-
ment would be even more difficult, and more expensive. In recog-
nition of this burden, Congress has given the private litigant Section
5(a) of the Clayton Act, providing that a final judgment or decree
in a government suit, either civil or criminal, is admissible as prima
facie evidence "as to all matters respecting which said judgment or
decree would be an estoppel .... ."11 Among other exclusions, if
the government's suit ended in a consent judgment or one entered
before the taking of testimony, this section has no application.114
A decree adduced through government litigation, then, pro-
vides the basis for anyone injured by the defendant to sue for treble
damages, having as prima facie evidence "all matters of fact and
law necessarily decided in the previous case.""' Because the grant
is an expansive one, the courts have rigorously upheld its stated
exceptions. For example, even though the issues had received full
hearing, if a judgment for the plaintiff was rendered but was re-
versed on appeal, the fact that a consent decree had been entered
upon remand precluded use of the decree in a later suit. 1 6 A judg-
ment entered on a plea of nolo contendere has also been excluded
from the scope of this section. 7
Therefore, if one's client seeks redress from a defendant whose
nolo plea has been accepted, he must prove the antitrust violation
by independent evidence. If, however, the transgressor has pleaded
guilty in the government action, the plaintiff stands to benefit from
Section 5. Contrary to former indications,1 ' guilty pleas have gen-
erally not been treated as consent judgments. In the recent electrical
equipment cases, three different circuits have held that guilty pleas
are not within the consent judgment proviso."'1 This line of prece-
12 Id. § 15.
113 Id. § 16(a).
114 Id.
115 Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
"16Barnsdall Refining Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Corp., 32 F. Supp. 308, 311 (E.D.
Wis. 1940).
117 City of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964).
118 Barnsdall Refining Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Corp., 32 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Wis.
1940); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939).
119 General Elec. Co. v. San Antonio, 334 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1964) ; City of Burbank
v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Commonwealth Edison Co. v.




dent establishes a direct, current trend permitting prior guilty pleas
to establish a prima facie civil case.
While these cases facilitate the plaintiff's situation, his counsel
should nevertheless be aware of the evidential limitations of Section
5(a). The prior adjudication sustains not his entire case but merely
all matters adjudicated as between the government and the defend-
ant. The general test is that of collateral estoppel: what matters
have conclusively been established between the parties?120 Another
limitation lies in the fact that the statute gives to this evidence
only a prima facie effect; the evidence is not conclusive and may
be rebutted.
121
After the violation is established, either by independent evi-
dence or through use of a former judgment, the plaintiff must prove
injury, causation, and a quantum of damage. The injury must, of
course, be a direct result of the violation; incidental harm is not
enough.122 While damages cannot be conjectural, the courts will
not require mathematical accuracy in proving the effects of abating
competition.' 2 3 Factors which can be proffered in making this proof
include increased cost caused by the violation, 124 loss of profits on
business either actually done or which was anticipated,'12  and the
decreased price a seller obtained for his goods. 2 '
Most important in computing damages is the "but for" test.
Plaintiffs are entitled to recover three times the difference between
what business they actually did and what they would have done
"but for" the defendant's abuse.' 27  Even though excess costs re-
sulting from violation may have been passed on to the plaintiff's
customers, they remain a part of recoverable damages.2s One cir-
cuit court has acknowledged that this rule, in fact, allows a plaintiff
120 See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942); Emich Motors Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
121 Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp. 271 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 961 (1960) ; Loew's, Inc. v. Cinema Amusements, Inc., 210 F.2d 86, 90
(10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 976 (1954).
1a Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1951).
123 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931);
Momad v. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., 172 F.2d 37, 42 (lst Cir. 1948).
12 4 Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks Co. v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
1
2 5 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
126American Crystal Sugar v. Mandeville Island Farms, 195 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1952).
12See, e.g., Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555,
561-62 (1931).
'28The defense of "passing on," while not new in the field, received particular atten-
tion in several of the recent electrical cases. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1964); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v.
General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Public Util. Dist. No. i v.
General Elec. Co., 230 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1964); and Notes at 64 COLUM.
L.Rev. 570, 586 (1964), 70 YALE L.J. 469 (1961), and 79 HARV. L. REV. 1475
(1966).
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to recover four times his damages- once from its customers and
thrice from the defendants.
"12
11
Finally, some attention should be given to that most urgent
of a client's concerns - cost. As we have seen, an antitrust action
differs from others, less in substance than in size. The fees and
costs involved are also commensurately larger. A prominent mem-
ber of the plaintiff's bar estimates that the minimal cost for the
smallest of cases is $5,000. For fees, he recommends a retainer of
$5,000 to $25,000, a percentage on damage recovery, and an agree-
ment as to the amount of attorneys' fees granted by the court. 3 '
The treble damage provision of our present law is the atavistic
remains of the English Statute of Monopolies of 1623. Vilified by
defense counsel, attacked by legislation, it remains a real incentive
for private industry to police itself. As the remedy gains more fre-
quent use, specialist and general practitioner alike should educate
themselves to its perils and its possibilities.
I
CONCLUSION
There are indeed few areas of business endeavor beyond the
application of the laws regulating trade. Pricing, discounts and
allowances, distribution, franchising, territorial and customer restric-
tions, exclusive dealings, refusals to deal, advertising allowances and
services, reciprocity - all may bring the businessman in contact with
a variety of state and federal laws. His lawyer should be prepared
to render preventative counsel, lest the client be subjected to the
civil and criminal sanctions provided for antitrust violations.
In addition, the lawyer for the small businessman should in-
form his client of the competitive tools built into the antitrust laws.
Trade associations have a wide range of permissible activities, each
of which can enrich the individual by strengthening the industry.
Unfair or predatory competition may be rooted out and punished,
with a treble-damage bounty going to the injured plaintiff. Finally,
the small businessman has in the antitrust laws both state and private
protection from the anti-competitive demands of influential sup-
pliers and customers.
'1Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203, 209 (7th Cir.
1964).
130 Alioto, The Economics of a Treble Damage Case, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 93 (1966).
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